Giuseppe Tartini - Lettere e documenti / Pisma in dokumenti / Letters and Documents - Volume / Knjiga / Volume II

472 184. Receipt from Tartini in the file of the Tartini-Vannetti correspondence Receipt from Signor Tartini 3 December 1745 I, the undersigned, receive one hundred and twenty lira from Signor Giacob Salon by order of Signor Jacob Pingherle, and on behalf of Signor Giovan Giorgio, to be had from Rovereto. Giuseppe Tartini 185. Letter with financial report of 1767 What I do not understand from a legal point of view is that, having verified, as stated by the same opposing party, my resolute opposition to keeping the newborn child (confessing the promise I made to the midwife of no small sum of money, so that she would take the newborn to the orphanage); having legally verified from the annulled baptismal note the reckless fraud perpetrated by the mother; having legally verified that the mother did not have, nor could have had, any authority to prevent the public benefit granted to me by the prince, except to her expense and detriment; and having legally verified from my plea to the patriarchal chancery the injustice and unlawfulness of the baptismal note, which was therefore authentically annulled; that after all of this, someone should tell me that from a legal point of view I am in the wrong. I know that the opposing party counts on the index, not annulled, of the baptism note, which is, son of Giuseppe Tartini and an unknown woman. But I think that this asserts my unequivocal right against the opposing party. If after annulling the baptismal note it is detected in the index, as it was noted there, this is the greatest proof of the justice done then with the annulment of that note which can no longer be denied as indicated in those precise, reckless and illegal terms, because in such terms it is found noted in the non-annulled index. I was proven right on this point, and the fault of the mother is confessed. But it must be added that the child should not endure the punishment for this reason. And for this reason, I must therefore bear it, though legally absolved from the title of Father. That to free myself from vexation I choose a form of mercy, is something completely different indeed; and this intention is very far from producing the legal consequences here demanded. On this point then I ask not by way of conscience, but legally, for a concrete response which either confirms or refutes my reasoning.